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The increasing number of candidates relying on their personal wealth and corporate 
experience in their bids for elected office raises the question: how do voters perceive 
these non-traditional candidates and their willingness to spend their personal money in 
order to win elected office? Using both an experimental design and data from the 2009-
2010 election cycles, I test for the effects of self-financing one’s political campaign on 
voter support for the candidates and their vote share in the general election, respectively. 
I find that partisans’ evaluations of candidates decrease when alerted to their self-
financing. Independents evaluate self-financing candidates more positively than 
traditional candidates. In addition, self-financing one’s campaign had a negative effect on 
candidates in the 2010 general elections for the U.S. House of Representatives 
independent of their spending levels.
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The 2010 congressional elections are probably best characterized by the sweeping 
loss of seats in the United States House of Representatives by the Democratic Party. 
These highly favorable electoral conditions motivated both experienced Republican’s to 
challenge incumbent Democrats and for wealthy individuals, most without political 
experience, to invest in their pursuit of a seat in Congress. The 2010 election continued a 
trend of an increasing number of candidates contributing to their own political campaigns 
and broke records in regards to the amount of money that was contributed by candidates 
for higher office.  Both the electoral results and political science research clearly indicate 
that, on average, self-financing candidates lose more than traditionally financed 
candidates (see Steen 2006 and Alexander 2005). But less is known about why self-
financing is correlated with losing on Election Day. Alexander raises three possibilities as 
to why self-financing is correlated with failure:  
1) self-financing prevents candidates from forming valuable linkages with the 
community and political organizations 
2) criticisms of self-financing result in a loss of votes 
3) self-financing candidates are usually light on the necessary political experience 
and skills required to run and win (2005, 356).   
Alexander rules out the first possible explanation by pointing out that almost all 
self-financing candidates still raise a substantial portion of their campaign funds from 
individuals and thus either are or should be developing the necessary connections. And 
the literature clearly provides evidence that more experienced candidates are more likely 
to be elected to Congress (see Jacobson 1989). The only remaining option is that 
criticisms of self-financing candidates cause a decline in support among voters. Up to this 
point, there has been no political science research that has evaluated voters, at the 
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individual level, to determine if they respond negatively to a candidate self-financing 
his/her political campaign. The best way to determine how voters respond to self-
financing is to utilize an experiment so that all other possible explanations can be ruled 
out.  
 The increasing number of self-financing congressional candidates over the 
last decade (see Steen 2006) combined with the continuing debate and periodically 
adjusted campaign finance regulations make developing a better understanding of how 
the electorate reacts to self-financing candidates a worthy question to pursue. The 
numerous considerations and issues involved in a person’s vote choice make pinpointing 
whether a single factor, self-financing, has a decisive effect a challenging task. I use both 
experimental and data from the 2010 election to zero in on the role of self-financing. The 
experiment allows me to both determine whether the act of self-financing affects voters’ 
perceptions of candidates and ultimately their vote choice, and whether Republicans and 
Democrats react differently to self-financing candidates. The election data allows me to 
verify the experimental findings and determine whether the act of self-financing actually 
has a negative effect in a general election. 
 I proceed by first presenting what is known about self-financers and how I 
believe voters may perceive them. Second, I present the details and findings from the 
experiment, which indicates that partisan voters do negatively perceive self-financing 
candidates. Third, I detail the results from the 2010 election data. Last, I conclude by 




The Role of Money in Political Campaigns 
A candidate spending his personal money in an effort to win elected office is not a 
new phenomenon, however, as the cost of running for office has increased so has the 
amount of money that candidates are dropping into their campaigns. This most recent 
election, 2010, was a record breaking year for personal spending with Republican 
California gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman spending more than 160 million dollars 
in her ultimately unsuccessful campaign. At the congressional level, Linda McMahon, 
Republican from Connecticut, and Jeff Greene, Democrat from Florida, spent over 46 
and 23 million dollars, respectively, on their failed Senate bids. Both the number of self-
financing congressional candidates and the amount of personal contributions has steadily 
increased over the last five election cycles. 
It is well known that money is necessary to run a competitive, modern political 
campaign (Abramowitz, 1991). The more money that a challenger spends is correlated 
with an increasing share of the vote up to a certain point. Campaign spending has a 
positive, but diminishing, effect on the electoral outcome. According to some researchers, 
this is true for incumbents and challengers (Green and Krasno 1988, Kenny and 
McBurnett 1994, Gerber 1998). While others have argued that campaign spending 
primarily affects challengers, especially those that lack the name recognition and the 
notoriety that their opponents possess (Jacobson 1978, 1985, 1990). Thus raising (and 
spending) campaign dollars is more important and (in most electoral situations) more 
difficult for challengers (Krasno, Green, and Cowden 1994). These difficulties may be 
part of the reason why challengers self-finance their campaigns much more frequently 
than incumbents (Steen 2006). Even incumbents who win their initial election by self-
financing usually fund their reelection campaigns through traditional fundraising 
techniques (Milyo and Groseclose 1999, Steen 2006). Across the five congressional 
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elections studied by Steen (2006), she finds that less than two percent of incumbents 
contributed more than $50,000 to their campaigns while just over thirty percent of 
challengers and open seat candidates contributed more than $50,000.  
The well documented incumbency advantage (for example see: Fiorina 1977, 
Jacobson 1987, Mayhew 1987) is certainly part of the reason that self-financers, and 
challengers in general, have such a poor track record of electoral success; with the vast 
majority of self-financers falling short in their attempts to gain an elected office (Steen 
2006). The incumbency advantage is only one of the possible factors that help explain 
why self-financers usually do not prevail.  
Similar to the way money matters, political experience matters. Candidates that 
have held any elected office perform better and win more often than candidates without 
any political experience (Jacobson 1989). In order to self-finance a modern political 
campaign, candidates must have substantial personal funds to bankroll such an endeavor. 
Naturally, this level of personal funding would be quite difficult for someone to acquire 
working in the public sector. Thus personal financers also tend to lack direct political 
experience as self-financing one’s political campaign is negatively correlated with 
political experience (Steen 2006). This is also one of the explanations proffered by 
Alexander as to why self-financing is correlated with electoral defeat. 
Beyond showing that self-financing candidates usually lose, researchers have 
examined the effect of personal spending on the final percentage of the vote. In a largely 
descriptive analysis, Wilcox (1988) suggests that personal funds do have an effect on 
electoral results, especially when used strategically and early in the campaign to 
demonstrate viability and aid in candidates’ fundraising success. Though the majority of 
non-incumbents in his study (based on the 1984 election) did have a positive net 
contribution to their campaign; the median net contribution was $16,926 in 1984 dollars. 
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Using two stage least square regressions, Steen determined that self-financing dollars 
translates into fewer votes than fundraising dollars. Her results demonstrate that spending 
the same amount of raised money has a much greater influence on the vote percentage 
than spending personal money, both for experienced and inexperienced open seat 
candidates (Steen 2006). However, her practice of separating raised and personal money 
is theoretically flawed since money raised and personal funds have the same purchasing 
power when it comes to campaign resources. For this reason, I find it problematic to 
separate the two types of campaign money and believe that her results are affected by 
omitted variables.   
 It should be noted that all self-financers are not equal. The candidate that 
spends one million dollars and funds his entire campaign is not equal to the candidate that 
spends one million dollars and funds only a tenth of his campaign. And neither candidate 
is equal to the political hopeful that spends forty-six million dollars and funds her entire 
campaign. Since the general public tends to overestimate the amount of money in politics 
and the sources of campaign contributions (see Ansolabehere et al. 2005), I believe that 
the amount self-financed is not as important as whether or not a candidate is labeled as a 
self-financing candidate by their own campaign, the media, or their opposition. While it 
is not clear at which point a candidate is labeled as self-financing, the more that a 
candidate personally contributes the more likely he or she is to have the self-financing 
label attached to him or her.  
This being said, whether or not voters are influenced by self-financing depends on 
whether or not they notice. Given the low levels of political knowledge in the United 
States (see Luskin 1987, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), some voters and more likely 
non-voters may not be aware of which candidates self-finance. As the amount of money 
self-financed increases and thus the saliency and news coverage associated with it 
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increases, the electorate is more likely to become aware (Zaller 1992). The difficulty 
determining voters’ awareness of self-financing and the role it may have is a reason why 
approaching a study on self-financing experimentally is an important complement to 
traditional electoral data.  
 When voters are aware of the source of campaign contributions, 
researchers have shown that the source does matter and that there are partisan differences 
in how voters perceive these contributions. Specifically, Democratic candidates were 
negatively affected by accepting corporate and special interest contributions, while 
Republican candidates were not (Roberts, Shaw, Huang, and Baek 2010). Personal 
contributions were not addressed in this paper, but it does give me reason to believe that 
self-financing has an effect on voters’ perceptions. And that the effect differs based on an 
individual’s party identification. 
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How the Electorate May React 
 Neither the political realities nor the political science literature provides 
much solid ground for predicting how voters respond specifically to self-financing. 
However, both do suggest that Republican identifiers may have a more positive outlook 
towards these candidates than Democratic identifiers. The higher number of self-
financing candidates running as Republicans indicates at least some level of support. And 
if Republican candidates are largely unaffected by accepting corporate and special 
interest funds, I have little reason to expect that their supporters will be as negatively 
influenced by personal contributions as Democratic supporters.  
While Republicans may have a more favorable evaluation of self-financing, both 
Democrats and Republicans may use self-financing as a gauge for the strength of the 
candidates partisanship. And thus, more enthusiastically turnout and support a candidate 
that is relying on both individuals and the traditional party apparatus to assist with their 
campaign fundraising. Lupia and McCubbins describe how voters may use both the 
number of campaign contributors and the type of contributors to infer differences 
between candidates (1998). If voters know that a candidate is self-financing much of 
his/her campaign, they will not be able to evaluate the candidates based on their 
supporters and instead may infer that there is not much of a difference between the 
incumbent and challenger.   
Recent campaigns involving self-financing candidates provide a rationale as to 
why the electorate may reward or punish them. Self-financers frequently tout their 
independence from special interests that other more traditional candidates must rely on 
for support. The electorate generally believes that special interest groups contribute much 
more money to political campaigns than they actually contribute (Ansolabehere et al. 
2005). The vast majority of self-financing candidates run on a major party ticket, and thus 
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they do not publicly make the claim that they are free from partisan pressure, but it is 
likely that voters make this association on their own. This would translate into 
independents and weak partisans reacting more favorably to self-financing than partisans 
and strong partisans.   
Due to both the prevalence of self-financers over the last few decades and the 
recent media attention provided to these candidates and their record breaking spending, I 
suspect that voters will have already developed an opinion on the merits of personal 
campaign contributions. Based on the electoral results, these established opinions should 
largely be negative and thus lead me to expect:  
The Self-finance Hypothesis - the level of candidate 
support among both Republicans and Democrats will decrease 
when the candidate running for office is self-financing his 
campaign, ceteris paribus.   
The higher frequency of self-financing candidates running on the Republican 
ticket and the more supportive embrace of self-financers by the Republican Party 
leadership allows me to hypothesize: 
 The Partisan Difference Hypothesis - Republican voters 
will be more supportive of self-financed candidates than 
Democratic voters, ceteris paribus.   
Self-financing candidates are usually candidates with minimal political experience 
that have had tremendous success in the private sector. Based on the importance of 
political experience in determining electoral success, as demonstrated in the literature, I 
expect: 
 The Corporate Experience Hypothesis - When voters are 
alerted to a candidate’s business background, the level of support 
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will decrease among the identifiers from both political parties, 
ceteris paribus.   
Although, the anti-Washington rhetoric of the 2010 electoral cycles may reduce or 
even reverse this expectation, especially among Republicans and ‘tea-party’ supporters. 
The previous three hypotheses center on the effects on Democrats and 
Republicans without addressing independents. Voters that lack an attachment to one of 
the parties are not expected to punish candidates that bypass the more traditional 
campaign financing methods or who have spent their careers outside of the political 
realm, in business.  
Independent Voter Hypothesis: Independent voters should 
have a favorable perception of a candidate’s self-financing and his 
non-political experience, ceteris paribus.   
 The last hypothesis focuses on how well major party, self-financing 
candidates actually do during the general election. While a small initial contribution to 
one’s own campaign is likely necessary (Wilcox 1988), spending enough of one’s own 
money to provoke the media, the opposition, and the general public to label a candidate 
as self-financing should have a negative effect. 
General Election Hypothesis: Independent of the amount of 
money spent on the campaign and the competitiveness of the 
district, simply being considered a self-financing candidate will 
have a negative impact on the percentage of the vote received by 





To test the first four hypotheses and develop a better understanding of how voters 
respond to a candidate’s willingness to spend his own fortune on an electoral campaign, I 
imbedded an experimental component on a nationally representative survey. The 
experiment is unique compared to previous efforts to address these questions since it 
focuses on how self-financing affects voting decisions and not the overall electoral 
results.  
The experiment was included as part of a 2010 YouGov Polimetrix post-election 
survey, conducted in early November 2010. The survey was administered nationally with 
a sample size of one thousand respondents. The experiment involved reading a brief 
description of a hypothetical congressional election. The description was manipulated so 
that the partisanship of the candidates alternated across conditions. Aside from party 
identification, the description of the first candidate remained constant. Whether or not the 
second candidate was identified as a businessman and whether or not he was identified as 
contributing ten million dollars of his personal money was varied across conditions. The 
exact wording of the description is below and is based off the opening paragraphs of an 
October 28, 2010 newspaper article from the Times Beacon Record by Dave Willinger: 
Imagine the following hypothetical race (italicized items are randomly assigned to 
respondents):  
 
In the 1st Congressional District, Republican/Democratic State 
Senator Tim Bishop is facing businessman challenger Randy Smith, who 
has personally contributed $10 million to his own campaign, refused to 
participate in the scheduled debate sponsored by the League of Women 
Voters . In what may prove to be the closest version to a debate between 
the candidates, both Bishop and Smith met independently with members 
of the editorial staff of TBR Newspapers in East Setauket.  Both 
candidates emphasized the crucial role of the economy in the campaign. 
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Smith called for providing tax incentives for small businesses and 
extending the Bush tax cuts "for everybody." Bishop favors extending the 
tax cuts for the bottom 98 percent of Americans but said extending cuts 
for the top 2 percent - those earning above $250,000 - would add $700 
billion to the deficit.    
 
Following the description, respondents were asked to indicate which candidate 
they would likely vote for in the hypothetical congressional election based solely on the 
information provided . After answering all questions directly associated with the 
experimental manipulations, respondents were asked at a later point in the survey how 
strongly they feel about candidates that self-finance their political campaign.  The 
respondents’ evaluations of the candidates were analyzed through a comparison of 
means. 
The description was based on a hypothetical election to the House of 
Representatives due to the lower levels of media attention that House elections receive 
compared to the Senate. In addition to less media coverage of House elections; citizens 
are also less knowledgeable of their House candidates and are infrequently able to 
identify the names of both of their major party candidates (Miller and Stokes 1963), 
much less the House candidates in another district in their state. While the description 
does not indicate that the congressional election is taking place in a particular state, it is 




 Respondents were asked to indicate their support for the candidates on a 
five point scale ranging from ‘I would certainly vote for Bishop’, coded 0, to ‘I would 
certainly vote for Smith’, coded 1. When the treatment mentioned candidate Smith’s self-
financing, the mean level of support for Smith decreased slightly among the entire sample 
from .4717 to .4699. When the data are disaggregated based on the respondents’ 
partisanship, the changes in the levels of support become more pronounced. Support 
among Democrats decreased from .3805 to .3319 and support among Republicans 
decreased from .6420 to .6176. Among independents the mean level of support was 
higher when candidate Smith self-financed, increasing from .4301 to .4827. The 
difference in means is statistically significant at the .05 level of significance for both 
Democrats and Independents. The Self-finance Hypothesis, the Partisan Difference 
Hypothesis, and the Independent Voter Hypothesis are all supported by these comparison 
tests. When voters are aware that a candidate is spending substantial amounts of their 











Figure 1: Mean Support for Smith With and Without Self-Financing 
 The treatments mentioning that candidate Smith was a businessman do not 
conform as nicely to my expectations as the self-financing treatments. Among the entire 
sample, the mean support for Smith was lower for the respondents that received the 
business treatment, reducing from .4886 to .4615. This difference is significant at the .05 
level of significance. Among partisans, support for Smith decreased from .6442 to .6145 
with Republicans when he was labeled as a businessman. For Democrats, support for 
candidate Smith increased from .3288 to .3593. Neither difference is statistically 
significant. In addition, support for candidate Smith was lower among Independent voters 
that received the business treatment. The difference approaches, but does not reach 
traditional levels of statistical significance. The Corporate Experience Hypothesis is thus 
substantively supported by the results of the Republican identifiers, but not by the 
Democratic identifiers. The Independent Voter Hypothesis is not supported.  
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The fact that Democrats’ evaluations of the candidate improved with the business 
treatment is quite surprising. Perhaps this is a consequence of the lower levels of 
enthusiasm among Democrats that was characteristic of the most recent election cycle. 
 
Figure 2: Mean Support for Smith With and Without Business 
 Last, respondents were asked to describe their feelings towards self-financing 
candidates by placing themselves on a five point scale ranging from zero, ‘much less 
likely to support them’ to one, ‘much more likely to support them’. Republican 
respondents identified themselves as the group most likely to vote for a self-financing 
candidate with a mean of .583. Independents were almost neutral with a mean of .506. 
Democrats identified themselves as being the least likely group to support self-financing 
candidates with a mean of .485. The difference in means between the Republicans and 
both the independents and the Democrats are statistically significant at the .05 level of 
significance. The difference between Democrats and independents is not statistically 
significant. How Democrats describe themselves and how they responded in the 
 15 
experiment are fairly compatible. Republican respondents self-reported a positive 
affection for self-financing candidates, but contradict their self-placements by negatively 
evaluating Candidate Smith based on his self-financing in the experiment. Independent 
voters were in the appropriate direction, but under reported how much self-financing 
influences their level of support for congressional candidates.  
 
Table 1: Self-Proclaimed Effect of Self-Financing 
Party Mean Standard Error 
Democrats 0.485 0.013 
Republicans 0.583 0.012 
Independents 0.506 0.014 
 
Figure 3: Effect of Self-Financing as Reported by Respondents 
 
The survey went out shortly after the 2010 election, respondents in states that had 
a high profile self-financing candidate may respond differently than the rest of the 
sample, based on their recent experience. Approximately ten percent of the survey 
respondents were residents of California, a state where a self-financing gubernatorial 











candidate Meg Whitman broke self-financing records in her lengthy primary and general 
election campaigns. To determine whether the high number of California respondents in 
the sample was swaying my results, I calculated the mean level of support among 
Democrats, Republicans, and independents excluding California respondents. The results 
for the Self-finance treatment were similar to the overall sample. The difference between 
the means for each party and independents was in the same direction, though slightly 
larger, but still was within the 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 4: Mean Support for Smith with and without Self-Financing excluding CA 
Respondents 
 The results for the business treatment for the sample excluding California 
respondents were also similar to the results for the entire sample. For both Democrats and 
independent voters the difference in means between the control and the treatment group 
increased slightly, compared to the larger sample. For the independents, the difference 
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decreased slightly. The difference between the overall sample and the sample excluding 
California residents is minor and does not affect the larger results.  
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The 2010 General Election Data and Methods 
 Using Federal Election Commission data for the 2009-2010 election 
cycles, I determine whether my experimental finding of a decrease in support for self-
financing candidates among partisans translates into a decrease in the candidate’s share of 
the vote in the 2010 elections for the United States House of Representatives. Since pure 
independents are such a small percentage of the electorate and turnout at lower rates, the 
general election results should largely be affected by the views of voters with some type 
of partisan affiliation. 
 To test this finding, I regressed the vote share of all non-incumbents on the 
log of the their total spending, the log of their opposition’s total spending, a dummy 
variable for self-financing candidates, a dummy variable representing whether the 
candidate has held any elected office, a party dummy variable, and the share of the vote 
received by the 2008 Democratic Presidential Candidate, Barack Obama. The log of the 
candidates’ spending was used to allow for the diminishing returns on campaign 
spending. President Obama’s share of the vote was included as a gauge for the underlying 
partisanship and competitiveness of the district.  
My analysis differs from previous research on self-financing candidates since 
instead of distinguishing the amount of money supplied by the candidates from their total 
campaign spending; I use a dummy variable to depict whether or not the candidate is a 
self-financer. I included the dummy variable for two reasons. First, my expectation is that 
simply being labeled or perceived by voters as a self-financing candidate has a negative 
effect. Second, distinguishing money spent by the campaign that was contributed by the 
candidate and money spent by the campaign that was contributed from all other sources 
would suggest that the aspects of the campaign that were funded by the two sources has a 
different effect when there is no theoretical reason to believe that campaign 
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advertisements or outreach, as examples, paid for by the candidate should translate into 
fewer votes than if the campaign activity was paid for using money from other sources. 
While there is some concern about an endogenous relationship between the spending 
variables and the challenger’s final share of the vote, I do use ordinary least squares since 
the regression model includes a variable accounting for the competitiveness of the 
district, the lack of suitable instrumental variables, and there is no reason to believe that 
my primary variable of interest, self-financing, is endogenous. 
 Using a dummy variable for self-financing required me to set some a 
priori criteria for whether or not a candidate is considered self-financing. This is 
necessary because almost all serious candidates must provide some startup money to get 
their campaign off the ground and to indicate to potential donors and supporters that their 
candidacy is viable (see Wilcox 1988). In the 2009-2010 election cycles, 335 of the 437 
challengers  had positive net contributions to their campaigns. Net contributions include 
all contributions made by the candidate and all funds loaned to the campaign by the 
candidate that were not reimbursed during the election cycle. All candidate loans 
effectively become contributions if the candidate loses while candidates that win are 
often able to raise money to repay their personal loans following the election. The self-
financing variable does not distinguish between loans made by challengers that win and 
challengers that lose the election. Among the 335 challengers, the maximum positive net 
contribution is $2,971,364. The mean is $97,539 and the median is $8,789. Clearly, these 
figures are skewed by a few challengers that make major contributions. Candidates are 
classified as self-financing if: 
1) They have a net contribution greater than or equal to $500,000.  
2) They have a net contribution greater than or equal to $100,000, and their net 
contribution is at least fifty percent of their total campaign expenditures.  
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The second factor was included since most challengers spend less than $500,000. 
The average amount spent by a challenger in 2010 was just over $535,000. In total 32 
major party candidates are considered self-financing candidates: 22 Republican 
challengers, 4 Republicans contending for open seats, 3 Democratic challengers, 2 
Democratic incumbents, and 1 Democrat vying for an open seat. The small number of 
Democratic self-financing candidates is not surprising since candidates are strategic and 
thus more likely to run for office when economic conditions and the presidential approval 
ratings favor their party (Jacobson 1989).  
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2010 General Election Results 
 The results from the regression model confirm the general election 
hypothesis. Congressional candidates that are considered self-financing candidates do 
worse in the general election than other non-incumbent candidates that are not considered 
self-financing. On average, the vote share of a self-financing non-incumbent candidate is 
2.58 percentage points lower than candidates that do not self-finance their campaign. This 
is statistically significant at the .05 level of significance. In an election year where several 
self-financing congressional candidates won or lost by less than three percentage points, 
the negative effective of self-financing can be decisive. All of the other variables that are 
included in the model are in the expected direction and statistically significant. The 
negative effect of self-financing is greater than the positive bump received from 
previously holding any elected office. The adjusted R-squared for the model is .8326.  
 




Self-Finance -2.5815 1.0146 0.0055 
Experience 1.3266 0.6817 0.0260 
Candidate Spending 2.2663 0.2124 0.0000 
Opposition Spending -1.8729 0.3658 0.0000 
Open Seat 2.4628 0.7646 0.0005 
Democrat -67.9449 3.2579 0.0000 
Obama Vote Share -63.7005 2.9704 0.0000 
Obama Dem Interaction 118.5911 6.2525 0.0000 





=.8326, Prob. F>0 = 0.000 
 The spending and control variables all performed as expected. While the 
opposition spending variable is mainly incumbents, open seats candidates are also 
included in the regression. The addition of non-incumbents in the opposition spending 
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variable helps to explain why the difference between spending by the candidate and their 
opposition is not as large as is usually found in comparisons between incumbent and 
challenger spending. Candidates vying for open seats, on average, had a final general 
election vote tally about 2.5 percentage points higher than candidates challenging an 
incumbent. Last, as expected Democrats fared worse at the polls than Republicans did in 
the 2010 elections. The more Democratic the district, as measured by President Obama’s 




 Both being labeled as a self-financing candidate and contesting a seat in 
the United States House of Representatives without having held any political office do 
influence both voters’ evaluations of congressional candidates and their share of the vote 
in the general election. These non-traditional candidates’ electoral prospects are affected 
by the labels themselves and are not simply a consequence of the candidates’ lack of a 
base of support or ineffective campaigning. These are certainly issues that self-financing, 
business candidates must address, but they must do so while considering how partisans 
and independents perceive them and their self-financing label. 
 Among both Democrats and Republicans the level of support was determined 
more by party identification than by self-financing one’s political campaign or having a 
business background. In all likelihood, the effects of self-financing and a business 
background are magnified in the absence of a partisan heuristic. The next step in 
determining exactly how big of a factor these two issues are in the American electoral 
context is to conduct a similar experiment and analysis for a primary election so that 
voters must rely on information other than their party identification. 
 Self-financing candidates can win congressional elections, but an average 
decrease of two and half percentage points can be detrimental in a close election. These 
candidates must find a way either to allay voters’ reservations for self-financing 
candidates or prevent how they finance their campaigns from becoming a highly 
publicized issue among partisans. At the same time, independent voters respond 
positively when politicians self-finance their campaigns. Since the support among 
partisans decreases when a candidate self-finances but is still largely driven by their party 
identification, it may be in the strategic politicians’ best interest to selectively publicize 





[therQ1] {single varlabel = "Vote Choice" order=reverse} With just this information, 
who would you be more likely to vote for? 
 <1> I would certainly vote for Smith 
 <2> I would probably vote for Smith 
 <3> I am neutral 
 <4> I would probably vote for Bishop 
 <5> I would certainly vote for Bishop 
  
[therQ2] {single varlabel = "Effect of self-funding" order=reverse}Many candidates fund 
their own campaigns with their own money. Which is closest to describing your feeling 
about such self-funders? 
 <1> I'm much more likely to vote for them 
 <2> I'm more likely to vote for them 
 <3> I'm neutral about self-funding 
 <4> I'm less likely to vote for them 
















Self – Financing Congressional Candidates 
Name District Seat Party Total Spent Contribution Result 
ADCOCK, CARSON DEE PA 13 Chal REP $932,478 $526,300 L 43% 
AGOSTA, MICHAEL NJ 9 Chal REP $196,395 $181,246 L 38% 
ALTSCHULER, RANDOLPH MR. NY 1 Chal REP $5,713,405 $2,922,653 L 50% 
BLACK, DIANE LYNN* TN 6 Open REP $2,328,658 $1,153,448 W 67% 
BRICKLEY, ANN CT 1 Chal REP $313,855 $214,752 L 37% 
CARDARELLI, MARCELO GABRIEL MD 2 Chal REP $223,115 $115,563 L 33% 
DELBENE, SUZAN K WA 8 Chal DEM $3,942,493 $2,284,034 L 47% 
DOHENY, MATT NY 23 Chal REP $3,440,808 $2,265,000 L 45% 
DUNMIRE, PEG FL 8 Chal REP $285,076 $266,630 L 3% 
FEIN, MATTIE CA 36 Chal REP $168,083 $141,471 L 34% 
FLEISCHMANN, CHARLES J TN 3 Open REP $1,378,924 $665,000 W 56% 
FLORES, BILL TX 17 Chal REP $3,389,497 $1,486,227 W 61% 
FOSTER, G. WILLIAM (BILL)* IL 14 Inc DEM $3,843,739 $545,000 L 44% 
GANLEY, THOMAS D OH 13 Chal REP $8,317,960 $1,730,050 L 44% 
HAYWORTH, NAN NY 19 Chal REP $2,129,637 $510,821 W 52% 
HULBURD, JON AZ 3 Open DEM $1,647,490 $513,354 L 41% 
IOTT, RICHARD BRADLEY OH 9 Chal REP $1,976,613 $1,703,100 L 40% 
JOHNSON, HAROLD NELSON NC 8 Chal REP $1,066,424 $615,000 L 43% 
KOLOSSO, TODD P WI 5 Chal DEM $175,545 $155,461 L 27% 
LINGENFELDER, JOHN JR TX 3 Chal DEM $154,857 $101,499 L 31% 
MCKINLEY, DAVID B* WV 1 Chal REP $1,705,724 $810,614 W 50% 
MILLER-MEEKS, MARIANNETTE JANE IA 2 Chal REP $1,191,868 $559,893 L 45% 
PHILIPS, MICHAEL LEE MD 8 Chal REP $177,651 $129,276 L 25% 
POLIS, JARED* CO 2 Inc DEM $895,953 $834,917 W 57% 
RENACCI, JAMES B* OH 16 Chal REP $2,403,263 $752,400 W 52% 
RIGELL, EDWARD SCOTT MR. VA 2 Chal REP $4,601,653 $2,971,364 W53% 
SIPPRELLE, SCOTT NJ 12 Chal REP $2,103,571 $1,475,000 L 46% 
TAYLOR, JEFF CA 17 Chal REP $176,754 $148,286 L 26% 
TURNER, ROBERT L NY 9 Chal REP $378,495 $204,700 L 41% 
URQUHART, GLEN DE 1 Open REP $1,364,257 $1,000,000 L 41% 
WILKERSON, CHARLES EDWARD CA 30 Chal REP $376,987 $306,934 L 31% 
* Denotes previous political experience. 
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